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Abstract 
In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) 
at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game 
features strategic substitutability.
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     1. Introduction
Many economic models are treated as two-player games. One can ﬁnd examples
in such ﬁelds as microeconomics (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer 1985), industrial
organisation (Tirole 1992), international economics (Canzonery and Gray 1985, Casella
1992), macroeconomics (Cooper and John 1988) and environmental economics (Hanley
and Folmer 1998). These are situations of interest whose transcription in the form of
games allows us to predict and analyze the consequences of non-cooperative behaviors.
To underline the importance of externalities among agents the authors often compare
the non-cooperative outcomes with the centralized ones. In such comparisons the level
of actions matters to characterize ineﬃciency in term of over or under use/ investment of
some observable quantities, and it turns out that both possibilities occur depending on
the situation at hand. A similar logic applies when we look for eﬃciency improvements,
such as when the challenge is to overcome pollution through emissions markets (for a
game-theoretic analysis of this question, see Helm 2003).
Most of the time the emphasis is put on symmetric agents and in such a case when the
game displays negative (positive) spillovers, players overact (underact) at a symmetric
Nash equilibrium in comparison with the symmetric cooperative equilibrium. As a result
one can expect a central authority to reduce (to increase) the actions of the agents. This
prescription avoids for instance the over-exploitation of a common ressource (Hardin
1968) or the under-provision of a collective good (Olson 1965)1.
The purpose of this note is to show that this conclusion no longer holds when the
assumption of symmetric players is relaxed. Collective rationality needs to balance over-
all welfare improvements with the ability of each individual to contribute to the social
goal. This may result in concentrating the eﬀort of improvement on one individual while
relaxing the eﬀort on the other because its impact on the global welfare is less impor-
tant. In the case of environemental problem, heterogeneity between regions may leads
to a situation where the national level may consider that one region have to lessen its
pressure on natural ressources and other have to increases it. We show that this result
has its origins in the strategic nature of the interdependancies between players.
This work is organized as follows. The next section introduces a stylized two-player
game. The third section presents our results. The last section is devoted to conclusions
and comments.
1More recent expositions of these problems can be found in Ostrom (1991) and Moulin (1995).
22. The model
Consider a simple two-player game where the agent 1 takes the action s1 and the
agent 2 takes the action s2. Their payoﬀ functions U and V depend on both s1 and s2:
U = U(s1;s2);
V = V (s1;s2): (1)
The two variables s1 and s2 lie in compact and convex feasible sets S1 = [s1;s1]
and S2 = [s2;s2]. The functions U and V are assumed to be increasing and strictly
concave in their own argument, twice continuously diﬀerentiable and globally concave.
We denote Ui, Vi, i = 1;2 the ﬁrst order partial derivatives of the payoﬀ functions with
respect to the variable si and Uij, Vij, i = 1;2 the second order partial derivatives of the
payoﬀ functions with respect to the variables si and sj. To improve the exposition of
the results, following Cooper and John (1988) we introduce four deﬁnitions:
[D1]: If U2 > 0 and V1 > 0, the game exhibits positive spillovers.
[D2]: If U2 < 0 and V1 < 0, the game exhibits negative spillovers.
[D3]: If U12 > 0 and V21 > 0, the game exhibits strategic complementarity.
[D4]: If U12 < 0 and V21 < 0, the game exhibits strategic substitutability.
In the sequel, we will maintain an assumption about payoﬀs which ensures that the
absolute value of the slopes of the reaction functions is less than unity. It is a familiar
suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (Friedman 1988), whatever
the nature of strategic relationships, complementary or substitutable.
[D5]: 0 < jU12j < jU11j and 0 < jV21j < jV22j.
From our assumptions on U(:;:) and V (:;:) the Nash equilibrium exists (Nash 1951)
and under [D5] it is unique.













2 ) = 0g:
3Since each agent ignores the eﬀect of his action on the other agent, generally this
equilibrium is ineﬃcient. Pareto-optimal outcomes can be obtained with a central de-
cision process that maximizes jointly the weighted sum of the payoﬀ. To underline the
role of heterogeneity between the agents we assume that this central authority gives to
the agents the same weight in the common decision process. The objective of the central
authority is:
W = W(s1;s2) = U(s1;s2) + V (s1;s2):
Given the assumptions on the payoﬀ functions, W is twice continuously diﬀerentiable























2 ) = 0g: (2)
We are interested in comparing the levels of action of the Nash equilibrium with
those obtained from the centralized problem. The benchmark case is given when the
agents have symmetric payoﬀ. In this framework, Cooper and John (1988) have shown
that the agents underact at a symmetric Nash equilibrium if there are positive spillovers.
Similarly it is easy to see that both agents overact when there are negative spillovers.
This result does not depend on speciﬁc assumptions about strategic complementarity or
substitutability.
3. Results in an asymmetric context
When the agents are heterogeneous we have to compare non symmetric Nash equi-
librium with non-symmetric centralized solution. In this context the distinction between
games that exhibit negative or positive spillovers is no longer suﬃcient to characterize the
nature of ineﬃciency. Since we consider that the agents are asymmetric we can expect
that the gaps between centralized and decentralized levels of action will be of diﬀerent
magnitudes. We go one step further. We claim that there exists situations where one
player overacts whereas the other underacts. To prove our claim, we have to distinguish
between games that exhibit strategic complementarity and games that exhibit strategic
substitutability. This distinction motivates two propositions2.
2In the following, we will limit our attention to the negative spillovers case. The results for the
positive spillovers case (and underaction) can be deduced with the use of similar arguments.
4Proposition 1. Assume [D5]. When the game exhibits negative spillovers and strate-
gic complementarity then agents overact at the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We use three lemma to facilitate the proof. Under [D2] and [D5] we establish:
 Lemma 1: the agents do not underact simultaneously.
 Lemma 2: the case where agent 1 underacts and agent 2 overacts cannot occur.
 Lemma 3: the case where agent 1 overacts and agent 2 underacts cannot occur.
The conjunction of these claims gives the result.














2 and, without loss of generality,


















Indeed, when moving from left to right-hand member of the above inequality, both
arguments of the payoﬀ function have changed. Under [D5], the impact of the ﬁrst
argument outweighs that of the second argument.
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2 ) > 0 ;
leads to a contradiction.
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2 ) > 0 ;
leads to a contradiction.














2 , then the assumption of
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2 ) > 0 ;
leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 1 to 3 imply the proposition.
6Proposition 2. Assume [D5]. When the game exhibits negative spillovers and strate-
gic substitutability then:
 (i) at least one agent overacts at the Nash equilibrium.
 (ii) in some cases the other agent underacts.
Proof. (i) Let us begin with the ﬁrst part of the proposition. Under [D2] and [D4] we



























2 ) > 0:
Contradiction.
(ii) In order to establish the second part of the proposition we will show that we can set




2 ]. Take a simple Cournot duopoly model
with linear inverse demand function p = a   (q1 + q2) and diﬀerentiated marginal costs.
The payoﬀs are:












It is easy to check that those payoﬀs satisfy Assumption [D5]. This is basically a situ-











(2 + c1)(2 + c2)   1
:










(2 + c1)(2 + c2)   4
:
Our claim is that for possible values of the parameters one duopolist underacts whereas





7From the expressions of qC
2 and qN











2 . Besides, from the part (i) we get necessarily that qC
1 < qN
2 . The
comparisons of the expressions qC
1 and qN
1 with the assumptions on the marginal cost
parameters would have led us to the same result.



























Figure 1: Asymmetric case with negative spillovers
Propositions 1 and 2 are illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The Nash equilibrium N is at the
intersection of the best reply functions r1 and r2. For commodity of exposition we draw
linear best reply functions. The curves UN and V N are the loci of the plane that give
the same payoﬀs as in the Nash equilibrium. The results can be described by noting that
the contract curve P is the set that contains all the possible Pareto-optimal outcomes
of the game. The form of the contract curve depend on the speciﬁc functional form
we adopt for U(:;:) and V (:;:). We have C  P, but its position on P depends on
the asymmetries between the payoﬀ functions. If the payoﬀs are symmetric then C
is located at the intersection between P and the 45 degrees line. The lines s2 = sN
2
and s1 = sN
1 divide the (s1;s2) space into quarters Ai, i = 1;::4. In the quarter A4
both players have lower level of action than in the Nash equilibrium: if C is in A4 then
both players overact. Proposition 1 says that C  A4 if there are negative spillovers
and limited strategic complementarity. This result is not surprising because we have
P  A4. Proposition 2 deals with a situation where P lies for a part in the quarter A4
but also have non empty intersections with quarters A1 and A3. These intersections are
depicted by the bold segments of P in ﬁgure (1b). If C  (P \A1) or C  (P \A3), then
the central decision process decreases the level of action of one agent while increasing
8the level of action of the other. This situations seems to occur when the degree of
heterogeneity between agents is suﬃciently high, as we can see in the cost-diﬀerentiated
Cournot duopoly example. Diﬀerences are such that the central authority increases the
level of action of the more productive agent and decreases the level of the other because
it induces a higher aggregate payment.
We can see in Figure 1b that case (ii) in Proposition 2 implies that the centralized
solution does not Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium. This result can be explained
by noting that the deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium and the concavity assumptions on
the payoﬀs imply that the set of outcomes that Pareto dominate the Nash equilibrium
noted Ps are such that Ps  A4.
We can remark that imposing individual rationality constraints leads to centralized
solutions where both players overact. Extending the result of Cooper and John (1988)
for two players asymmetric games leads to modiﬁcations in the common decision process.
4. Conclusions
In a class of two-player games we have stressed on the role of heterogeneity between
agents when comparing Nash equilibria with centralized outcomes. It turns out that
under the assumption of limited strategic complementarity, the heterogeneity does not
change the qualitative results already known for the symmetric agents case. On the
contrary, when the game features strategic substitutability the noncooperative actions
of the players could lie in opposite sides of their respective centralized actions. Thus,
only one agent over-exploits the common ressource or under-subscribes to a public good.
This phenomenon seems more likely to occur as diﬀerences between agents increase, and
implies that the centralized solution violates individual rationality (see Wilson 1991, and
Hwang and Choe 1995, for examples in the ﬁscal competition literature with asymmetric
jurisdictions). If the central authority takes care about individual rationality constraints
it has to give more weight to some players in the common decision process. This phe-
nomenon is of particular interest for decision process in institutions that gather diﬀerent
countries like EU (Casella 1992).
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